Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments by Lunawat, Radhika et al.
Chapman University 
Chapman University Digital Commons 
ESI Working Papers Economic Science Institute 
12-14-2020 
Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments 
Radhika Lunawat 
University of California, Irvine 
Timothy W. Shields 
Chapman University, shields@chapman.edu 
Gregory B. Waymire 
Chapman University, waymire@chapman.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers 
 Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lunawat, R., Shields, T. W., & Waymire, G. (2020). Financial reporting and moral sentiments. ESI Working 
Paper 20-40 . https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/335/ 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of 
Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu. 
Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments 
Comments 
ESI Working Paper 20-40 
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/
esi_working_papers/335 
Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments*  
Radhika Lunawat 
University of California-Irvine 
Timothy W. Shields 
Chapman University and Economic Science Institute 
Gregory Waymire† 
Emory University and Economic Science Institute 
 




Dating back at least to Adam Smith (1790), philosophers and researchers expect that 
people will behave differently when they know their actions are observable to others. We 
hypothesize that financial reporting reveals managers’ actions and leads them to take 
different actions that are better aligned with investor interests. We posit that the reason 
why is the activation of our internal mental self-evaluation that Smith refers to as an 
“Impartial Spectator.” We test this hypothesis with an experiment in which we 
manipulate the availability of a financial report that makes managerial actions 
transparent. Our evidence shows that financial reporting leads a manager to choose 
reinvestment and resource sharing actions that are better aligned with investor interests, 
even in a sparse experimental setting where the investor can impose no cost or confer no 
reward on the manager. This same effect holds in a setting where the investor can shut 
down the firm at any point and take a sizable portion of the assets. Our evidence is 
important because it suggests that part of financial reporting’s economic value comes 
from its enabling moral evaluation by the manager in addition to its traditional 
contracting function 
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“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants.” 
Louis Brandeis (1914, 92) 
 
1 Introduction 
 Disclosure of a financial report can alter equity prices if the disclosure leads 
investors to trade differently, or it can result in penalties when contracts are tied to 
financial statement data (e.g., when low interest coverage triggers default). Indirect costs 
can also result when a forthcoming financial report leads a manager to act preemptively 
to avoid a contractual constraint tied to reported numbers. Is it possible also that a 
forthcoming financial report can lead to differences in managerial behavior even when 
direct valuation or contracting consequences are absent, and if so, why would such effects 
occur? We hypothesize that when managers know that a forthcoming report will reveal 
their actions, the manager’s internal moral sentiments will lead their actions to differ 
favorably for investors. We experimentally test for the presence of such effects in a 
sparse, clean setting where financial reporting can confer no valuation or contracting 
benefit. 
Our predictions derive from the moral sentiments of individuals that Adam Smith 
(1759/1780) hypothesized to be the foundation for economic exchange (see also Smith 
and Wilson, 2017; 2019).1 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), Smith hypothesizes 
that individual moral action arises from a hypothetical “Impartial Spectator” that comes 
 
1 A sentiment is an “affection of the heart from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue 
or vice must ultimately depend” (Smith, 1759/1780, 18). We thus define a moral sentiment as a feeling 
(both emotional and cognitive) that another person is intentionally benefited or harmed by an action that 
serves to define the propriety of that action.  
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to exist within an actor’s mind through life experience. This Impartial Spectator judges an 
action’s propriety in light of extant moral customs and norms. We hypothesize that 
transparent financial reporting enables an investor to judge the propriety of managerial 
actions; this in turn leads managers to take more investor-beneficial reinvestment, 
dividend, and self-compensation actions than they would in the absence of reporting. 
The assumption at the heart of Smith’s TMS is that people take self-beneficial 
actions and avoid self-harmful actions. Personal experience teaches us to recognize and 
judge like-minded actions by others. Through this we learn which of our actions will likely 
earn others’ praise (blame), and gradually we come to favor (disfavor) taking such actions. 
Moral sentiments develop because an actor comes to believe that an action (1) is 
inherently praiseworthy regardless of whether anyone discovers that the action was 
taken and (2) will actually be praised by others if they learn of the action taken (Smith and 
Wilson, 2017, 35–36).2 We argue that a transparent financial report revealing a manager’s 
resource allocation actions activates such moral sentiments within managers and results 
in manager actions that ultimately increase investor wealth.  
Our experiment uses a six-period reinvestment game where, after every period 
except the final one, the manager divides earnings between an investor dividend, self-
compensation, and reinvestment of remaining resources to increase future earnings. 
 
2 The desire to be viewed positively by others was recognized by foundational Western thinkers before 
Adam Smith. It is found in the works of Plato, and in modern psychological theories of self-presentation and 
impression management (we thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out). However, we use the 
framework of Smith and Wilson because they explicitly model the tradeoff between intrinsic and monetary 
utility, which allows us to make specific predictions on how financial reporting affects managers’ actions 
about reinvestment and resource sharing.  
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After the final period, the manager divides remaining resources (i.e., cumulative earnings 
net of prior dividends and compensation) between the investor and herself.  
We manipulate two features of this reinvestment game. One is the availability of 
a financial report at the end of each period that provides complete information about the 
manager’s actions; the investor can observe earnings and net assets free from bias and 
noise but cannot directly impose a sanction on a manager for acting contrary to investor 
interests. We interpret this manipulation as evidence of financial reporting. Financial 
reporting in real firms can illuminate some, but not all, of the manager’s actions, so our 
first experimental manipulation provides a powerful means for making behavior 
observable and transparent. 
Our second manipulation lessens power differences between the parties by giving 
the investor a right to end the game at any time and obtain a nearly equal share of the 
net assets remaining within the firm. This manipulation allows us to test whether investor 
and managerial actions are robust to differences in the relative power of the manager. 
We test two hypotheses. The first is whether a manager’s final distribution to the 
investor is greater when financial reporting is available even if the investor has no 
recourse against a manager. We test this hypothesis controlling for the prior actions of 
both the manager and the investor. Our second hypothesis is that financial reporting 
prompts the manager to increase reinvestments before the final period by reducing either 
manager self-compensation or investor dividends in earlier periods, or both.  
Our evidence supports both hypotheses. First, after controlling for prior 
compensation, dividends, and investment, managers distribute significantly higher 
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amounts in the final period when reporting is present compared to when reporting is 
absent. Statistically, this manifests as a significant main effect for financial reporting in 
ANOVA models that compare final distribution levels across four treatments that vary by 
presence of reporting and the investor liquidation option. We also document a qualitative 
shift toward (away from) praiseworthy (neutral) final distribution levels paid to investors 
when financial reporting is available.  
Consistent with our second hypothesis, financial reporting is associated with 
higher reinvestment rates in periods 1–5, accompanied by reductions in both investor 
dividends and manager self-compensation. That is, the presence of financial reporting 
leads both investors and managers to forgo early periods’ personal earnings and generate 
higher earnings in later periods. 
Our analysis reveals other interesting behavior beyond what our formal 
hypotheses predicted. First, investors invest larger amounts when financial reporting is 
present. This suggests that the economic value of reporting in our experiment lies in the 
beneficial discretionary behavior it prompts for both investors and managers. Second, in 
the absence of the investor liquidation option, we find no evidence that a more egalitarian 
distribution of power increases overall gains. Finally, we note that manager participants 
are not behaving as pure altruists who passively split gains equally with investors. While 
managers distribute amounts in the final period that correlate with past investments, 
managers also capture a larger share of total wealth than investors in all treatments. 
Adam Smith’s (1759/1790) conception of human morality is central to the 
development of our hypotheses; we suggest that financial reporting’s value arises, at least 
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in part, from the morality it evokes. The internal Impartial Spectator is admittedly 
unobservable, as are any moral sentiments activated in our experimental setting. Other 
experimental research also finds that people act altruistically, and sometimes more so, 
when they are physically observed in dictator games (e.g., Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006) 
and public good games (e.g., Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004). One of 
our contributions is that we provide a rationale for this observed behavior.  
Competing theoretical candidates for altruistic actions in trust games include 
reciprocity (Ostrom and Walker, 2003), where trust is repaid with trustworthiness 
(Rousseau, et al 1998). However, reciprocity alone cannot explain our results. In our 
experiment, both with and without financial reporting, the manager observes how much 
has been invested and chooses how to repay the investor’s trust; therefore there should 
be no treatment effects of financial reporting. This is also true of distributional or “other 
regarding” preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmit, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), which 
predict that an idea of what is fair, not the investor’s knowledge of what is being 
distributed, should shape a manager’s choices. 
Another candidate for behavior in repeated games is reputation building, where 
one type of manager takes actions to signal their type or to mimic the actions of another 
type in an attempt to dupe investors (Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2016; Liang, Marinovic, 
and Varas, 2018). Although this explanation is consistent with the observed differences 
in a manager’s reinvestment with and without financial reporting, it is inconsistent with 
the observed final distribution, where, again, we should find no treatment differences. 
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Prior research has documented that financial reporting, or increased disclosure, is 
correlated with manager behavior (e.g, Bushman and Smith, 2001; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016; Rong, 2018, Roychowdhury, Shroff, and Verdi, 2019). Our findings suggest this 
result may not be due solely to underlying constraints that result from compensation 
contracts based on reported accounting numbers (e.g., Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Dutta 
and Gigler, 2002); our findings suggest that regardless of how a report is used, financial 
reporting can encourage a manager to act in owners’ interests. That is, we find that 
financial reporting restricts manager self-dealing, even when investors cannot use reports 
to directly discipline the manager. This result suggests a deeper complementarity 
between financial reporting and governance. 
The broader meaning of our findings is that financial reporting, at least within the 
context of our experiment, can have economic value even when opportunities for 
contracting and settling up through ex post sanctions are not feasible. These findings 
suggest a deeper role for financial reporting linked to the moral underpinnings of trust 
within modern economies.3 In this sense, our study complements prior experiments on 
the foundations of accounting that demonstrate how accounting records and disclosures 
promote beneficial exchange by improving the memory of past interactions (Basu et al., 
2009) and enable discretionary actions that can increase both managers’ and investors’ 
wealth (Lunawat et al., 2020). Our study also extends the “humanomics” model and 
 
3 The usual caveat about the external validity of findings obtained from a controlled laboratory experiment 
(i.e., student participants, anonymity, scale of compensation) applies in our case too. 
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evidence in Smith and Wilson (2017; 2019) to settings with core accounting institutions 
like reporting. 
We describe the structure of our experiment and develop hypotheses in the next 
section. We then describe procedures for running the experiment and collecting data. 
Empirical evidence is then reported, and the article concludes in a final section. 
2 Experimental Structure and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 The Reinvestment Game 
Consider a game that will last six periods, as depicted in Figure 1A.4 The manager is 
endowed with a production technology that yields earnings from investment during the 
period. The results from investment are represented by a stochastic multiplier that can 
assume a value of 1, 2, or 3 with equal probability. The total earnings from investment 
during the period equal the realized multiplier multiplied by the total amount invested at 
the start of the period. 
The total resources invested at the start of a period come from two sources. First, 
the investor receives a new endowment of capital (5 monetary units, or MUs) every 
period that can be invested in the firm. Second, beginning at the end of period 1, the 
manager can choose to reinvest resources rather than take a salary or pay a dividend. 
Reinvestment generates earnings identical to those generated by new investments from 
the investor. At the end of every period 1–5, the manager receives earnings from 
investment and then divides this amount between (1) a salary that is put into the 
manager’s private account, (2) a dividend that is put into the investor’s private account, 
 
4 The reinvestment game is inspired by Lunawat (2009) and LaRiviere, McMahon, and Neilson (2017). 
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and (3) a reinvestment that is placed in a joint-savings account that can generate earnings 
in the next period.  
At the end of the sixth and final period, the manager receives the earnings and 
distributes them between the investor and herself. Total investor earnings for the 
experiment equal the sum of endowments not invested in periods 1 – 6, interim dividends 
received during periods 1 – 5, and the final distribution in period 6. The manager’s total 
earnings equal the salaries taken in periods 1 – 5 and the final distribution taken in period 
6. 
We manipulate two factors within a 2×2 between-subjects design where all subject 
pairs play the Reinvestment Game for a maximum of six periods. In the Baseline 
treatment, only the manager can observe the balance of the manager’s personal account, 
the realized multiplier, earnings, and the joint-savings account balance.  
As our primary manipulation, in the Reporting treatment, at the end of each period, 
we make a financial report available to the investor, whereby the investor is also informed 
of the total earnings for the period, the manager’s salary during the period, and the joint-
savings balance to be reinvested for the next period. In this respect, observability 
eliminates all information asymmetry in our experimental setting so that the 
manipulation provides a powerful test of our hypothesis that transparent financial 
reporting leads to changes in managerial actions in the absence of contracts and 
sanctions.5 In the game (and for public corporations), investors’ investment is seen by the 
 
5 That is, the use of a transparent financial report free from noise eliminates the possibility that a non-result 
on our main hypothesis is the result of a weak manipulation for reporting. For actual firms, a financial report 
does not necessarily reveal the manager’s choices.  
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manager with or without financial reporting. Likewise, a dividend paid by a manager is 
seen by the investor with or without financial reporting.  
Our second manipulation, in the Liquidation treatment, mostly equalizes the power 
of the investor and the manager. Specifically, once the manager has made her allocation 
decision, the investor has the option of terminating the game at the end of any interim 
period 1–5 and receiving 40% of the joint-savings account balance at the time the 
liquidation option is exercised. Within the Reinvestment Game, a liquidation option 
lessens the relative power of the manager over the investor but can entail a cost of 
forgone earnings since early liquidation removes the possibility of larger earnings in later 
periods. 
The treatment where both reporting and liquidation are present is referred to as the 
Both treatment. Our 2×2 design is summarized in Figure 1B. 
Our Reinvestment Game differs from a standard multiperiod investment game in an 
important way.6 In the standard game, the earnings generated in a given period must be 
paid out to either the manager or the investor. Thus, earnings come entirely from new 
investment; that is, the funds used to generate earnings depend entirely on the investor’s 
decision to continue investing. In the Reinvestment Game, the funds used to generate 
earnings come from investment by the investor and reinvestment by the manager. The 
fact that funds can be reinvested implies that earnings are subject to compounding effects 
– reinvesting an increasing amount of earnings means that the total pie available for 
multiplication can overwhelm the total available in the standard game after only a few 
 
6 The repeated version of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe’s (1995) “Trust Game.” 
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periods.7 This means that the relative power of the manager increases as reinvestment 
by the manager grows through time relative to any new investment by the investor.  
2.2 Manager behavior in the final period 
Experimental economists Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson have incorporated elements 
of Adam Smith’s TMS in several experimental research papers (e.g., Smith, 2017; Smith 
and Wilson, 2017; 2018). In TMS, Smith analyzes the ethical drivers of why and how we 
act as we do. The ethical forces Smith analyzes in TMS have been described as “the other 
invisible hand” (e.g., Ashraf, Camerer, and Lowenstein, 2005; McCloskey, 2006) and 
provide the foundation for conduct by buyers and sellers in a market (Boulding, 1969). 
Smith and Wilson (2019) integrated both invisible hands within a framework that they 
call humanomics – a modernized version of TMS.8  Smith and Wilson’s intent was to 
develop a theory that could account for subject behavior in dictator, ultimatum, and trust 
games at odds with the predictions of neoclassical economics using utility maximization. 
A prominent example is the one-shot trust game of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), 
where an investor can invest up to $10 with a manager, which will triple in value, and 
which the manager will divide between the investor and herself. The surprising result 
from Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe’s experiment is that investors make positive 
investments and managers return positive amounts to the investor; both actions are 
 
7 To numerically illustrate, assume: (i) the game lasts six periods, (ii) the investor always invests five, (iii) the 
multiplier equals two in each period, and (iv) the manager reinvests everything in each period. In the 
Standard Investment Game there would 60 for the investor and manager to split, compared to 630 in the 
Reinvestment game. 
8 Smith and Wilson’s 2019 book Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-
First Century is a blend of theory from both of Adam Smith’s main scholarly contributions. 
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inconsistent with the neoclassical economic prediction that investors will not invest 
because managers will steal all resources and leave the investor with nothing. More 
generally, humanomics offers a theory of how we conduct ourselves in substantive social 
interactions where we are aware that our actions can benefit or a harm another person.  
Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator is the cumulative result of our experience in judging 
others’ conduct. The Impartial Spectator is a mental construct by which we approve or 
disapprove of conduct – others’ and our own. The Impartial Spectator judges actions and 
motivations without prejudice and classifies such actions as praiseworthy, neutral, or 
blameworthy. The Impartial Spectator helps us to see ourselves as others see us – it is an 
ideal “internalization of what is approved or not approved by others” (Smith & Wilson, 
2019, p. 101). Mueller (2016, 313) suggests that Smith’s Impartial Spectator is a product 
of inductive reasoning applied to personal experience and is reflected in “personal tacit 
knowledge.” 
Smith and Wilson argue that despite being self-interested, we have three 
additional desires related to propriety of our actions in economic settings. Beyond 
personal wealth, we desire to (1) avoid being seen as blameworthy, (2) take inherently 
praiseworthy actions, and (3) have our actions be viewed by others as praiseworthy. 
There is heterogeneity in the degree to which different individuals weight these desires.9 
Smith and Wilson argue that actions are not selfless but rather are chosen to satisfy these 
desires for propriety as perceived by the Impartial Spectator. That is, actions are chosen 
to jointly satisfy desires for propriety and personal wealth. 
 
9 See Smith and Wilson (2019, 167) for a formal utility representation of these desires. 
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Prior experimental evidence is consistent with the aforesaid in single-period 
settings when agents’ actions are always observable (Smith and Wilson, 2017; 2018; 
2019). Observability of actions (and the related issues of information asymmetry and its 
resolution via financial reporting) has so far been an unexplored topic in this literature 
but is the primary focus of this article. By manipulating the observability of managers’ 
actions in the form of a financial report, we disentangle the effects of a desire to take 
inherently praiseworthy actions and a desire to be viewed as praiseworthy.10 
A financial report reveals the current period’s earnings and assets. The key 
differences that our experimental manipulation induces are that the investor acquires 
information about (1) the manager’s choice to reinvest the current period’s earnings 
versus take a salary (which reduces reinvestment), and (2) the amount of available 
resources from which a dividend can be paid in any period. 
In general, we expect that investors will earn greater profits in the Reinvestment 
Game when financial reporting is available. To see this, consider a one-period version of 
an investment game with possible multipliers similar to those in our experimental setting. 
That is, the players play a one-shot investment game with multipliers drawn from a 
distribution with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 1,092, and the manager then divides 
the total available between herself and the investor.11 We expect that an investor would 
earn more from playing this game with financial reporting since a financial report reveals 
 
10 Adam Smith (1759) wrote, “The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered 
as some sort of proof of praiseworthiness.” 
11 The minimum is where the investor invests once and the realized multiplier is 1 in that and subsequent 
periods. The maximum is where the investor invests the same amount in each period and the realized 
multiplier in every period equals the maximum of 3, so the effective multiplier is equal to 36 + 35 + 34 + 33 + 
32 + 31. 
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the total amount of resources that the manager divides. Because financial reporting 
reveals to the investor the total resources the manager takes, the investor can evaluate 
the manager’s resource-sharing decision in terms of its fairness and the manager’s 
sacrifice of resources. Within the context of Smith and Wilson’s humanomics model, the 
manager’s resource-division choice becomes a praiseable action.12 
Within the Reinvestment Game, the theory in TMS suggests that the Impartial 
Spectator will guide a manager in choosing how to divide resources after the final period. 
The final distribution to the investor is bounded between zero and the total wealth 
controlled by the manager at the end of period 6. In the Reinvestment Game, the amount 
of resources to be divided after the sixth period ( 𝑊! ) equals l!	(𝐼𝑁𝑉! 	+
	𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉"),	where l!	equals the multiplier in period 6, 𝐼𝑁𝑉! equals the investor’s period 6 
investment, and 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉"  equals the amount reinvested by the manager at the end of 
period 5. 
If we assume that actions are discretely viewed as praiseable (another is benefited), 
neutral, or blameworthy (another is harmed), then a manager will be concerned with two 
points over the interval [0, 𝑊!]. The first is the minimum necessary for avoiding blame 
(BW). The second is the minimum that must be paid to earn praise (PW). A manager is 
guided to set these levels according to what her Impartial Spectator believes to be 
appropriate given available wealth, dividends previously paid by the manager, past 
 
12 In this thought exercise, as in all treatments, the manager’s final-period action entails no pecuniary cost 
since the investor cannot react to such an action after the game is completed. 
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salaries taken by the manager, and past investments made by the investor. These 
alternatives are ordered by amount as follows: 0	 ≤ BW	 ≤ PW ≤ 𝑊!.  
Table 1 shows the effect on the manager’s desires for propriety and personal wealth 
at the distribution levels of BW and PW for treatments where no reporting occurs and the 
treatments where the investor is informed via a financial report of the terminal wealth to 
be divided by the manager. The level at which the final distribution changes from 
blameworthy to neutral (BW) or from neutral to praiseworthy (PW) depends on the 
context, which includes the history of past investment by the investor as well as prior 
dividends to the investor and salaries taken by the manager. That is, BW and PW are 
expected to be lower if interim dividends are greater. PW will be higher if prior salary is 
more positive, as a higher level is needed to reach an appropriate investor share of 
generated wealth. At the same time, higher salary decreases terminal wealth.  
We posit that the blameworthy level (BW) is at a minimum equal to the amount 
where the investor is made financially worse off by interacting with the manager, a 
definition consistent with Rousseau et al. (1998). This means that the investor took a risk 
and ceded control to the manager, who succumbed to opportunism and did not 
reciprocate the investor; that is, the total of all amounts returned is less than the total of 
all investments. A praiseworthy level (PW) is one where, after the final distribution, the 
manager has shared an appropriate share of the generated wealth above the investor’s 
total investment.  
Comparing the choice between a final distribution of zero and BW indicates that a 
manager with financial reporting will prefer to pay BW rather than zero only if the utility 
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that comes from satisfying a desire for propriety is great enough. This same reasoning 
applies for a manager without financial reporting seeking to avoid being blameworthy, 
because the investor will know the extent to which dividends have covered the amount 
invested. 
The distinction between a final distribution viewed as praiseworthy and one viewed 
as neutral is more complicated. The loss of monetary utility in PW is greater than the loss 
of monetary utility in BW. When the dividend is viewed as neutral, all managers 
experience nonmonetary utility by satisfying their desire to avoid being seen as 
blameworthy. However, when the distribution is PW, the managers with financial 
reporting also experience a utility gain by satisfying their desires to avoid being seen as 
blameworthy, to take praiseworthy action, and to be viewed as praiseworthy. The last 
desire is satisfied because the investor can assess the dividend as praiseworthy given 
knowledge of the wealth generated. Without financial reporting, in the absence of 
knowledge about the wealth available for distribution, the investor will not likely view the 
same amount as praiseworthy. In this respect, financial reporting allows others to judge 
the manager’s final decision; without financial reporting, the manager cannot satisfy her 
desire to be viewed as praiseworthy by increasing the distribution to the PW level. 
This logic suggests that managers in treatments with financial reporting are more 
likely to prefer a final distribution of PW over BW than managers in treatments without 
financial reporting. This gives us our first hypothesis:  
H1: When financial reports are available that make managerial actions observable, a 
manager is more likely to reciprocate with a higher final distribution than would a 
similarly situated manager in a treatment without financial reporting, holding past 
dividends and salary constant.  
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2.3 Manager behavior during interim periods 
In a world without financial reporting, the only means for a manager to satisfy the 
desires to avoid being seen as blameworthy and to be seen as praiseworthy is to take an 
action visible to the investor. In interim periods 1–5, this means paying a dividend. Yet, 
paying an interim dividend has ambiguous effects on the manager’s utility. Although the 
manager’s current sharing of resources has a positive effect on manager utility, this utility 
gain could be negated by the opportunity cost of lower future earnings. Thus, the net of 
these two factors means that paying a dividend may be viewed as either praiseworthy or 
neutral. If the action is viewed as praiseworthy, it satisfies the desires to avoid being seen 
as blameworthy, to take praiseworthy actions, and to be seen as praiseworthy. However, 
if the action is viewed as neutral, paying a dividend increases the manager’s nonmonetary 
utility even in the absence of financial reporting, as the manager avoids being seen as 
blameworthy. 
With financial reporting, the investor knows all manager actions and total available 
resources at all times, including reinvestment in interim periods. This implies that a 
manager can satisfy her desires for propriety by either reinvesting current earnings or 
paying a dividend. From the perspective of the investor, reinvestment increases potential 
future earnings because earnings are compounded, even though there is no certainty that 
these will be shared. Assume reinvestment is viewed as neutral. In this case, the 
manager’s nonmonetary utility increases as she satisfies her desire to avoid being seen as 
blameworthy, and her expected monetary utility will increase. If the investor judges 
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paying a dividend as neutral, then the manager satisfies her desire to avoid being seen as 
blameworthy, but her expected monetary utility will decrease. Because reinvestment can 
be observed, the marginal utility to the manager of paying an interim dividend is likely 
lower because financial reporting makes her reinvestment choice observable compared 
to a world without reporting. Thus, a manager desiring propriety will be less likely to pay 
an interim dividend when financial reporting is present because reinvestment is 
observable.  
From the investor’s point of view, siphoning off a salary and reducing reinvestment 
decrease utility. Decreasing reinvestment results in lower future earnings from 
compounding – a harmful action that the investor will judge as blameworthy. 
Furthermore, taking a salary during an interim period decreases the manager’s utility, as 
she has taken a blameworthy action, which, in the presence of financial reporting, is made 
known to others. Thus, if a manager elects to satisfy her desire for propriety, then the 
manager will take a lower salary in the presence of financial reporting. In combination, 
our second hypothesis follows from these predicted effects: 
H2: When financial reports are available, managers will take lower interim salaries for 
themselves and pay lower interim dividends to the investor, both of which result in 
increased reinvestment, compared to a setting where financial reporting is absent. 
 
2.4 Effect of investor right to liquidate 
A natural question about our experiment is whether manager behavior within the 
Reinvestment Game would change if the relative power of the actors to influence total 
gains were more equal. For example, corporate managers’ power in interactions with 
investors likely differs in the presence of takeover threats or when managers can be fired. 
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To evaluate this, we created two treatments identical to the Baseline and Reporting 
treatments described in Section 2.1, except that the investor was given a decision right to 
“fire” the manager by liquidating the firm and receiving 40% of the total wealth available 
in any period 1–5 prior to the end of the experiment. We label these the Liquidation and 
Both treatments. We do not offer specific hypotheses about the effects of the liquidation 
option manipulation, except to note that we expect H1 and H2 also to apply to a 
comparison between the Liquidation and Both treatments. Instead of stating a specific 
hypothesis about the effect of the liquidation option, we instead pose a research question 
about the effects of financial reporting in the presence of a liquidation option: 
RQ1: Does financial reporting increase manager resource sharing and wealth creation 
in the Reinvestment Game to the same extent when a liquidation option is available 
that lessens power differences between the manager and the investor? 
 
3 Data Collection 
The experiment was conducted at a U.S. research university. A total of 286 
participants were recruited from a participant pool consisting primarily of undergraduate 
students; each participant was randomly assigned to a single session. There were three 
sessions of each of the four treatments. All sessions except one contained 24 participants; 
a single session of the Reporting treatment contained only 22 participants. The authors’ 
institutions obtained institutional review board (IRB) approval for this experiment. The 
IRB approval required us not to use deception. 
In all treatments, participants were informed that the game would last six periods. 
We used the same set of stochastically generated (realized) multipliers for each treatment 
so that variation in outcomes would result from variation in behavior. We randomly 
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generated unique sequences of six multipliers for each investor–manager pair in the 
Baseline treatment and then used these same sequences for investor–manager pairs in 
the other treatments. This technique provided variation in multipliers between groups 
within a treatment but no variation in the distribution of multipliers across treatments. 
Each session lasted approximately 1 hour. Participants were seated at visually 
isolated workstations that allowed them to interact anonymously over a local computer 
network. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while each participant followed 
along with a printed copy of the instructions. The instructions explained the experimental 
procedures and payoffs. After reviewing instructions, participants answered several quiz 
questions (see the appendix for the instructions and quiz). The experimenter privately 
answered any questions regarding the experimental procedures. Each participant was 
assigned a role, labeled “Person A” for the investor and “Person B” for the manager, and 
remained in that role for the entire experiment.13 In each of six periods, the investor first 
made an investment decision, then the manager made an allocation decision, and both 
were given feedback (the extent of which was manipulated between treatments). Finally, 
the investor had the option to liquidate the partnership (manipulated between 
treatments).  
Each participant was paid a $7 participation fee in addition to payoffs from the 
Reinvestment Game after signing a receipt. Experimental earnings in the Reinvestment 
 
13  We described the roles and actions available to participants using neutral terms to minimize the 
possibility of subjects making implicit assumptions about behavior (Haynes and Kachelmeier, 1998). 
 20 
Game were exchanged for U.S. dollars at a rate of 10 to $1. On average, subjects earned 
$16.85, including their participation fee. 
4 Results 
Our primary independent variables for our two experimental manipulations, 
Reporting and Liquidation, are 1 if present, and 0 otherwise. Each firm (investor–manager 
pair) is treated as an independent unit of observation. The significance level is 5%.  
We start with summary measures of wealth and payoffs for the investor and manager. 
We then examine the manager’s final distribution choice to provide evidence on our first 
hypothesis, concerning the final distribution to the investor. We then examine 
reinvestment during interim periods (with regard to our second hypothesis). We conclude 
by examining the effects of the liquation option. 
4.1 Summary measures of wealth and payoffs 
Our hypotheses predict how wealth and payoffs are increased with financial reporting. 
Before showing evidence about the particular hypotheses, we first show that wealth and 
payoffs are indeed greater with financial reporting. 
 Table 2 shows the wealth generated in each treatment. We conducted an 
untabulated two-way ANOVA to assess the influence of Reporting and Liquidation on 
wealth. The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 9.31, p < .003, 
indicating a significant difference in total wealth generated by firms with reporting (Mean 
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= 257.28) compared to firms without (Mean = 137.42).14 The main effect for Liquidation 
was insignificant, F(1,139) = 1.05, p = .306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 1.31, p < 
.254. 
We calculate a measure, efficiency, that equals the total wealth generated by the firm 
divided by the maximum wealth that would have been created if (1) the investor had 
always invested the maximum, (2) the manager had always reinvested the maximum, and 
(3) the firm were not liquidated. Efficiency is shown in the next column of Table 2. We 
conducted a two-way ANOVA on the influence of Reporting and Liquidation on efficiency. 
The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 6.41, p < .013, indicating a 
significant difference in efficiency between firms with reporting (Mean = 45%) and firms 
without (Mean = 31%).15 The main effect of Liquidation on efficiency was insignificant, 
F(1,139) = 1.05, p = .306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 1.31, p < .254. 
Both wealth created and efficiency are greater with financial reporting. As a result, 
the payoffs for the investor and the manager increased with financial reporting. The Total 
Investor Payoff and the Total Manager Payoff, are shown in Table 2. ANOVA results show 
a main effect of Reporting, p < .013 for both payoffs; no significant effect of Liquidation, 
p > .111 for both payoffs; and no significant interaction, p > .228 for both payoffs. 
 
 
14 We perform two robustness checks on this result. First, the result is robust to wealth being distributed 
log-normally. An ANOVA on the log of Wealth finds a significant main effect for Reporting, p < .004, but not 
for Liquidation or for the interaction (both p-values > .160). Second, the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test indicated that wealth generated by firms with reporting was significantly greater than wealth 
generated by firms without reporting, Z = 2.491, p = .013. 
15 For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that efficiency by 
firms with reporting was significantly greater than efficiency by firms without reporting, Z = 2.704, p < .01. 
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4.2 Hypothesis tests 
4.2.1 Effects of financial reporting on the final investor dividend 
In the final period, the manager’s sole decision is how to divide the final resources 
between herself and the investor. The manager’s choice of the final distribution to the 
investor is unaffected by the investor’s future behavior because the investor cannot react 
in any observable way to the manager’s choice. The manager can only infer any blame or 
praise the investor assigns. Likewise, if a blameworthy manager were previously 
mimicking a praiseworthy type in periods 1–5, her choice of final distribution would reveal 
her blameworthy character. 
Our first hypothesis is that a manager will reciprocate past investment to a greater 
degree when financial reporting is present, as reporting allows an investor to distinguish 
neutral from praiseworthy behavior. Our data analysis for H1 proceeds in four stages. 
First, we examine the influence of independent variables Reporting and Liquidation on 
the final distribution. Next, we net the final investor distribution (such that the value is 
negative if the investor was made worse off for trusting a blameworthy manager, positive 
if made better off for trusting, and zero if made whole) and examine the influence of 
independent variables Reporting and Liquidation on the net final distribution.	 Next, we 
categorize managers’ period 6 distributions as praiseworthy, neutral, or blameworthy and 
evaluate qualitative differences in manager behavior with and without financial 
reporting. Last, we test for differences in the level of the final distribution to investors 
using a regression model that controls for other variables that affect the final distribution. 
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The final distributions per treatment are reported in panel A of Table 3. The mean 
and median amounts for the investor’s final distribution are more positive when reporting 
is present. For example, the mean (median) equals 46.9 (9.5) for Reporting compared to 
21.9 (7.0) for Baseline. The results of a two-way ANOVA model of the influence of 
reporting and liquidation on the final distribution to the investor are shown in panel B of 
Table 3. The main effect of Reporting was positive and significant, F(1,124) = 7.20, p < 
.008, but no significant main effect for Liquidation or the interaction is observed.16  
For a given value of the final distribution, it is difficult to judge the appropriateness 
of the manager’s choice without considering the investor’s investments and dividends 
received. For example, assume the investor has invested $25 over time. A final 
distribution of $20 will be judged differently if the investor’s past dividends exceed $25 
than if dividends have never been paid. To compensate, we net the final distribution by 
subtracting all investments and adding prior period dividends and report the amounts by 
treatment in the second column of panel A of Table 3. The results of a two-way ANOVA 
model of the influence of reporting and liquidation on the net final distribution to the 
investor are shown in panel B of Table 3. The main effect of Reporting was positive and 
significant, F(1,124) = 7.20, p < .021, but no significant main effect for Liquidation or the 
interaction is observed.  
We find similar results for the manager’s final distribution: a main effect of Reporting, 
but not significant main effect for Liquidation or the interaction. Given these results 
 
16 This result is robust to assuming that the data are distributed log-normally. When the dependent variable 
is the log of final distribution, we find a significant main effect for reporting, p < .021, but not for liquidation, 
nor for the interaction (both p-values > .35), using ANOVA. 
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(panel B of Table 3), we analyze final distributions across treatments with and without 
financial reporting. 
Categorizing final investor distributions as praiseworthy or blameworthy requires (1) 
a measurable threshold for distinguishing between a blameworthy final distribution and 
one that is neutral (BW) and (2) another threshold where the final distribution shifts from 
neutral to praiseworthy (PW). One admittedly conservative estimate for BW is the 
minimum necessary to ensure that the investor was not penalized for having invested 
resources. For purposes of this analysis, we computed BW as equal to 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉# −!#$% ∑ 𝐷𝐼𝑉# , 1}"#$% . Under this categorization, the cutoff BW does not 
depend on financial reporting, as the investor observes investments and dividends in all 
treatments. In setting PW, we chose a level such that an investor would be ex post 
indifferent to (hypothetically) liquidating the firm after period 5 or investing in period 6. 
In this structure, PW = 40%	𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉" + 𝐼𝑁𝑉!  for each manager–investor dyad. Under 
this categorization, the cutoff does depend on financial reporting, as the investor only 
sees reinvestment in treatments with financial reporting. This categorization implies that 
a final distribution less than BW is classified as blameworthy and a final distribution above 
PW is classified as praiseworthy. Observations between BW and PW are categorized as 
neutral. This occurred when either an investor invested small amounts and/or the 
manager paid dividends in periods 1–5 in excess of investment, leaving little for 
reinvestment. 
On the basis of these categories, manager behavior changed qualitatively in the 
presence of financial reporting. Figure 2 depicts the percentages of observations where 
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the final distribution to the investor was classified as blameworthy, neutral, or 
praiseworthy for firms with and without financial reporting. The percentages of 
distributions classified as blameworthy were similar for firms with and without financial 
reporting (about 40% in both cases) – there was no significant difference for the 
economies with reporting per the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Z = 0.56, p = .57. In contrast, 
financial reporting induced a marked shift in frequency when moving from neutral to 
praiseworthy, Z = 2.114, p = .034.17 The frequency of praiseworthy final distributions is 
about 40% with reporting versus under 30% without reporting. This finding is consistent 
with the proposition that the frequency of managers’ blameworthy actions is invariant to 
reporting, as investors do not need reporting to know if they are worse off for trusting; 
however, managers are more likely to undertake costly praiseworthy actions only when 
these actions are evident via reporting.  
The final stage of our data analysis for H1 examines final investor distributions 
(reported in panel B of Table 3). The final period’s earnings available to be divided 
between the investor and manager will be an increasing function of past investments and 
a decreasing function of past dividends and salaries; we control for these effects when 
testing H1 with a regression model. To test whether a manager greater reciprocates past 
investment more intensely when financial reporting is present, we estimate the 
relationship between the level of funds the investor received in period 6 and their prior 
 
17  We perform three alternative specifications to test the robustness of this shift from neutral to 
praiseworthy. In the first test, we don’t reclassify cases to neutral when PW was less than BW. In the second 
and third tests, we use 45% and then 50% instead of 40% in calculating PW. All cases show significant shifts 
in frequency when moving from neutral to praiseworthy with financial reporting (p-values of .031, .040, 
and .041 for the three tests, respectively). 
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investments, while controlling for dividends received in periods 1–5 and past salaries 
taken by the manager: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽& +	𝛽%𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 +	𝛽'𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠'
+ 𝛽(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽)𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠
+ 𝛽"𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 	𝜀 
 
( 2 ) 
 
Investor Final Distribution equals the dividend paid to the investor in the final period 
of the experiment (𝐷𝐼𝑉!). Reporting is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if financial 
reporting is present. Investments2 is the sum of squared past investments, that is, 𝐼𝑁𝑉%' +
𝐼𝑁𝑉''+	. . . +𝐼𝑁𝑉!' . Ostrom and Walker (2003) report that in standard one-shot trust 
games, higher investments lead to higher returns on investment (defined as return less 
investment scaled by investment). The authors comment that participants who trusted 
more were more likely to gain wealth. The analysis suggests a quadratic relationship 
between investment and the final dividend returned by the manager. Examining the 
distribution of returns in a trust game, Gómez-Miñambres, Schniter, and Shields (2020) 
show superior fit when using a quadratic versus a linear model of investment. 
PriorDividends is the sum of past investor dividends, weighted by the expected effect of 
dividends on the final-period distributed earnings, that is, 𝐷𝐼𝑉% × 2" + 	𝐷𝐼𝑉' ×
2)+. . . +𝐷𝐼𝑉" × 2%. PriorSalary is the sum of past salaries taken by the manager, also 
weighted by the expected effect of salary on the final-period earnings, that is, 
𝑆𝐴𝐿% × 2" +	𝑆𝐴𝐿' × 2)+. . . +𝑆𝐴𝐿" × 2%. 
Regression results are reported in panel C of Table 3. The estimation sample excludes 
firms that have been liquidated, or firms with zero earnings in the final period, because 
the manager has no observable choice in these cases. The main coefficient of interest is 
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𝛽(, which captures the marginal effect of past investment on the final distribution in the 
presence of financial reporting. We expect this coefficient to be positive. 
Consistent with Ostrom and Walker (2003) and Gómez-Miñambres, Schniter, and 
Shields (2020), we find that the coefficient on squared investments was positive and 
significant. Most importantly, the estimated value of 𝛽(  equals 0.456, which was 
significantly greater than zero at p < .05. The total coefficient on investment with 
reporting (𝛽' +	𝛽() was significantly greater than zero at p < .001 and was approximately 
73% larger than without reporting (𝛽'), giving support to H1. The intercept for economies 
with financial reporting (𝛽& +	𝛽%) was not significantly different from economies without 
reporting (𝛽&) , and the coefficients on prior dividends and prior salaries were both 
negative and significant, as expected.18  This result is consistent with managers choosing 
to transfer more wealth to the investor when reporting allows that choice to be seen as 
praiseworthy. 
4.2.2 Reinvestment in interim periods 
Our second hypothesis is that managers will be more likely to reinvest during interim 
periods when a financial report is available to the investor. Evidence for H2 is shown in 
Table 4. We conducted a two-way ANOVA to evaluate the influence of reporting and 
 
18 We evaluated the robustness of these results by estimating models similar to equation (2), where we 
keep the same functional form but apply different weights to investments and/or prior dividends and salary. 
Alternative model 1 uses the sum of investments (𝐼𝑁𝑉! + 𝐼𝑁𝑉"+	. . . +	𝐼𝑁𝑉#)	rather than the sum of 
squared investments, which results in lower adjusted R-squared than the model reported, indicating poorer 
fit. Alternative model 2 weights prior dividends and salaries by the number of periods left (i.e., 𝐷𝐼𝑉! × 5 +
	𝐷𝐼𝑉" × 4+. . . +𝐷𝐼𝑉$ × 1)  rather than the exponential weight used above. This also results in lower 
adjusted R-squared compared to reported results. Despite the alternative weightings, all models have 
comparable directional effects; that is, prior dividends and salary decrease the final dividend, investment 
increases it, and the financial reporting increases return on investment. 
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liquidation on average reinvestment. The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of 
F(1,139) = 10.74, p < .002, indicating a significant difference between reinvestment in 
firms with (Mean = 40.34) and without (Mean = 20.81) reporting.19 The main effect for 
Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 0.02, p = .882, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 
2.66, p = .106.20 
We find that not only did managers reinvest more with financial reporting, the 
proportion of earnings that could be reinvested was greater. We report the average 
proportion of earnings reinvested in Table 4. We conducted a two-way ANOVA to 
evaluate the influence of reporting and liquidation on reinvestment. The main effect of 
Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 5.36, p = .022, indicating a significant difference 
between reinvestment in firms with (Mean = 68.7%) and without (Mean = 57.8%) 
reporting. The main effect for Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 1.68, p = .194, as 
was the interaction, F(1,139) = 0.81, p = .371 
Recall that the greater reinvestment hypothesized has to be the result of lower 
dividends, lower salary, or greater investment. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the 
influence of reporting and liquidation on interim dividends. The main effect of Reporting 
yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 5.60, p < .019, and the main effect for Liquidation was 
insignificant, F(1,139) = 1.05, p = .306. The interaction was significant, F(1,139) = 4.45, p 
< .037. Simple main effects analysis showed significantly lower dividends with reporting 
 
19 For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that reinvestment 
for firms with financial reporting was significantly higher than it was for firms without reporting, Z = 2.530, 
p = .011. 
20 All untabulated ANOVA results reported in this section are on the average per participant as reported in 
Table 4. All reported results are robust to examining interim period measures in a repeated measures 
ANOVA.  
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when liquidation was possible (comparing the Liquidation treatment to the Both 
treatment, p < .001) but no significant difference in dividends when liquidation was not 
possible (Baseline treatment vs. Reporting treatment, p = .865). 
We also conducted a two-way ANOVA of the influence of reporting and liquidation on 
manager salaries. The main effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 3.35, p = 
.069, indicating a marginal difference between salaries taken when firms had reporting 
(Mean = 3.73) and when they had no reporting (Mean = 2.61).21 The main effect for 
Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 0.32, p = .306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 
0.05, p = .832. 
Although we did not predict any changes in investment, we do find that investors 
invested significantly more in firms with financial reporting. A two-way ANOVA on the 
effect of Reporting yielded an F-ratio of F(1,139) = 6.78, p < .011, indicating a significant 
difference in level of investments between firms with (Mean = 3.94) and without (Mean 
= 3.37) reporting.22 The main effect for Liquidation was insignificant, F(1,139) = 0.32, p = 
.306, as was the interaction, F(1,139) = 0.05, p = .832. This result is consistent with the 
trust game of Reitz, Sheremeta, Shields, and Smith (2013), where the ability to observe 
subsequent outcomes in a three-person trust game resulted in greater investment 
(although they do not find a difference in trustworthiness with regard to the amounts 
returned to the investor). 
 
21 For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that manager 
salaries for firms with reporting were smaller than for firms without reporting, Z = 2.671, p < .01. 
22 For a robustness check, we performed the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, which indicated that investment 
for firms with financial reporting was significantly greater than for firms without financial reporting, Z = 
2.498, p = .013. 
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The effect of greater investment and reinvestment is higher joint savings in 
treatments with financial reporting. This effect is powerfully obvious in Figure 3, where 
we plot the average joint-savings account balances of nonliquidated firms across periods. 
This figure shows that the effect of compounding was greater with financial reporting. 
In the Reinvestment Game, investment creates, in part, the upper bound for both 
dividends and salaries. Yet, despite higher investment in the presence of financial 
reporting, we find lower dividends and lower salaries. The combined effect of greater 
investment and reinvestment is shown in Figure 4, where we report the frequency of high 
investment and high reinvestment relative to a benchmark of 50% of what was possible 
– the investor investing at least half the endowment and the manager reinvesting at least 
half of the earnings. There was a significant shift in investment and reinvestment (i.e., to 
the upper right-hand quadrant) for firms with reporting versus firms without, Z = 2.586, 
p < .01. 
Cumulatively, these results support H2. The observed manager choices are consistent 
with a desire to avoid blame and/or to seek praise in interim periods. Without financial 
reporting, these desires can inhibit reinvestment. With reporting, all else equal, these 
same desires create wealth for both investor and manager, as shown in Table 3. We next 
explore the effects of reporting and liquidation on total wealth. 
4.3 Effects of investor’s right to liquidate 
We find no difference in the number of firms liquidated due to reporting. Seven of 36 
investors exercised the liquidation option in the Liquidation treatment where financial 
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reporting was not possible, and 6 of 36 investors exercised the option in the Both 
treatment, where financial reporting was present. 
As discussed in the prior section, we find no significant main effect of liquidation on 
wealth, efficiency, investment, or reinvestment. At the same time, we did find a 
significant main effect for reporting. 
To determine the effect of financial reporting controlling for liquidation, we construct 
three measures of maximum wealth generation and compare results between treatments 
with and without financial reporting. The first measure, Maximum Investment, is a binary 
measure equal to 1 if the investor invested his full endowment every period, and 0 
otherwise. The second measure, Maximum Reinvestment, is a binary measure that equals 
1 if the manager fully reinvested earnings in periods 1–5, and 0 otherwise. The last 
measure is Maximum Efficiency, which is the cross-product of Maximum Investment and 
Maximum Reinvestment. These measures are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that the percentage of managers who consistently reinvested the 
maximum possible was greater with financial reporting. When liquation was not available, 
32.4% of the managers in the Reporting treatment reinvested the maximum amount in 
every period compared to only 8.3% in the Baseline treatment, Z = 2.493, p = .013. A 
similar effect is observed for treatments where liquidation is possible – 25% of Both 
managers always reinvested the maximum, compared to only 2.8% in the Liquidation 
treatment, Z = 2.707, p = .007.23 
 
23 This result is robust to running both logit and ANOVA analyses, where we find a significant main effect of 
reporting but no significant effect of liquidation or interaction. 
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The percentage of firms for which we observe maximum efficiency, that is, both 
investment and reinvestment are the maximum possible, is also reported in Table 5. 
When liquation was not possible, only 2.8% of the firms in the Baseline treatment 
achieved maximum efficiency, compared to 17.1% in the Reporting treatment – a 
significant difference, Z = 2.016, p = .043. When liquidation was possible, no firm achieved 
maximum efficiency in the Liquidation treatment, but 13.9% of firms did in the Both 
treatment with financial reporting. This difference is significant, Z = 2.302, p = .021.24 In 
regard to RQ1, the results we have obtained here – a higher maximum reinvestment and 
higher maximum efficiency with financial reporting, both with and without an option to 
liquidate – show that financial reporting improves wealth creation. 
We fail to find a significant difference in maximum investment after controlling for 
liquidation. When liquidation was not available, 25% and 37% of investors invested their 
entire endowments in the Baseline and Reporting treatments, respectively. When 
liquidation was available, 19% and 28% of investors invested their entire endowments in 
the Liquidation and Both treatments, respectively.25  
5 Conclusion 
We experimentally evaluate whether financial reporting has economic value in a 
sparse setting where contracting is not possible. We posit that financial reporting leads a 
manager to alter her behavior in anticipation of an investor’s evaluation of the manager’s 
 
24 This result is robust to running ANOVA analysis, where we find a significant main effect of reporting but 
no significant effect of liquidation or interaction. Logit analysis was not appropriate, as the Liquidation 
treatment had no successes. 
25 This result to robust to running both logit and ANOVA analysis, where we find a significant main effect of 
reporting, but no significant effect of liquidation or interaction. 
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conduct, as revealed by a report of earnings and amounts reinvested in the firm. The 
manager’s anticipation of the investor’s evaluation activates the manager’s approval-
seeking behavior, and this translates into the manager choosing more efficient resource 
allocation. 
Our finite-period Reinvestment Game is similar to a corporation in that an investor’s 
initial investment provides “seed capital” required for the firm to operate, but 
reinvestment allows managerial power over firm resources to grow relative to investors’ 
power. Our main experimental manipulation was the presence of a financial report 
revealing to the investor each period’s earnings and assets reinvested by the manager. A 
second manipulation granted the investor a right to liquidate the firm before the final 
period, which allowed us to evaluate whether the effect of reporting changes when the 
investor and the manager have more equal power. 
We hypothesized with this experiment that financial reporting has two effects on 
managerial actions. First, because reporting reveals the manager’s final resource 
allocation, the manager can expect the investor to judge unambiguously whether the 
manager’s choice was generous or selfish. We therefore hypothesize that the manager 
will pay a higher final distribution to the investor, controlling for past dividends and 
salaries, when reporting is present. Second, financial reporting makes interim 
reinvestment observable and subject to the investor’s moral evaluation. Thus, a manager 
under a condition of financial reporting will be more likely to avoid interim dividend 
payments and personal compensation so they can reinvest funds, thus obtaining higher 
earnings. We find strong evidence supporting both hypothesized effects – other things 
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being equal, managers pay higher final distributions and reinvest larger amounts when 
financial reporting is present.  
Our findings provide support for the long-standing view that financial reporting 
provides “sunlight” that renders managerial behavior transparent and leads to more 
virtuous managerial conduct (Brandeis, 1914, 92). Economics-based research in 
accounting assumes a conflict between investors’ interests and managers’ interests (e.g., 
Dye, Glover, and Sunder, 2015). Our findings suggest that financial reporting involves 
more foundational aspects of human ethics and the means we use to infer others’ motives 
based on observable outcomes. Thus, the consequences of financial reporting may result 
from forces that have a deep evolutionary history in humans. We encourage future 
research that can evaluate the generalizability and magnitude of the effects we document 
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7.1 Instructions (Liquidation Treatment) 
Introduction 
This is an experiment on decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds 
for this research. During the experiment you will earn money in an experimental currency 
unit (ECU). We will denote ECU with the $ symbol. At the end of the experiment earned 
ECU will be converted to US dollars at a rate of 10 ECU to 1 US dollar. Your earnings are 
dependent upon your decisions, other’s decision, and upon chance. Earnings will be added 
to your show-up payment. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment and nobody 
except the cashier will know what you have earned. It is very important that you remain 
silent throughout the experiment and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect, and very much appreciate, your adherence with these policies.  
 
Everyone in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into a partnership with an 
assigned role of either Person A or Person B. You and the other person in your partnership 
will make choices that will determine your payoffs. You will be partnered with the same 
person throughout the entire experiment. You will remain in the role of Person A or Person 
B for the entire experiment. 
 
The Experiment 
You will be asked to make deposits into a Joint Savings account and personal accounts in 
a number of periods. The total amount deposited in the Joint Saving account is subject to 
multiplication every period allowing it to grow over time. The experiment will last 6 
periods. 
 
Each period proceeds as follows. 
 
First, Person A receives $5 in new funds and then decides how much of the $5 to send to 
Person 2 with the remainder going to his/her personal account. Person A can send $0, $1, 
$2, $3, $4 or $5. The amount Person A does not send to Person 2 is automatically deposited 
into his/her personal account (denoted as the Person A account).  
 
Next, the amount sent by Person A and the Joint Savings account balance from the prior 
period are added together. The total is multiplied by 1, 2, or 3. All values for this multiplier 
are equally likely. Person B receives the multiplied amount and then decides how to 
distribute the amount received by making deposits into either (1) the Person A account, 
(2) the Person B account, or (3) the Joint Savings account. These three deposits must 
equal the amount received by Person B. 
 
Person A and Person B keep the amounts deposited into their personal accounts.  
 




Joint Savings account. 
 
At the beginning of period 1, the Joint Savings account is empty. When Person B receives 
a multiplied amount in second stage of the first period, Person B decides on a split of the 
amount received through deposits into three accounts: 
(1) Person A account (amount returned to Person A), 
(2) Person B account (amount kept by Person B), and 
(3) Joint Savings account (amount carried forward and subject to multiplication 
next period). 
 
The	 amount	 carried	 forward	 in	 the	 Joint	 Savings	 account	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 first	
period	will	be	added	to	the	amount	that	Person	A	sends	in	the	second	period.	This	
























Suppose Person A sends $3 to Person B in period 1. Since this is the first period and the 
Joint Savings account is empty, only the $3 sent by Person A is multiplied. Suppose the 
random multiplier for period 1 equals 2. Then, the multiplied total that Person B receives 
is $6 ($3 2). Person B next decides on a 3-way split of the total $6 received. One 
possibility is for Person B to keep $1 by depositing this amount into the Person B account, 
return $3 to Person A by depositing this amount in the Person A account, which leaves $2 
to be carried over to the Joint Savings account for period 2. 
 
Now the Joint Savings account equals $2 at the start of period 2. If Person A sends $4 to 
Person B in period 2, the total to be multiplied is $6 ($2+$4). If the multiplier for period 2 
is 3, then the total multiplied amount equals $18 ($6 3). If Person B deposits $4 into the 
Person A account and $6 into the Person B account, then $8 ($18 – $4 – $6) is the Joint 
Savings account balance to be carried over to the third period. 
 
 
The Joint Saving account grows exponentially, where the rate of growth is the 
multiplier. Exponential growth differs from linear growth, where the growth amount is 
just a constant number.  
 
To illustrate the difference, consider the following example of linear growth. Imagine that 
you invest $2 today, and every day the investment grows by $2. It grows today, 
tomorrow, and so on for 5 days. At the end of the first day you have $4, tomorrow $6, the 
next day $8, the next day $10, and on the last day $12.  
 
Now consider an example of exponential growth, where you put $2 in the first day, and 
that doubles each day. At the end of the first day you have $4, tomorrow you have $8, the 













Day	1 Day	2 Day	3 Day	4 Day	5
Linear	Growth Exponential	Growth
 41 
Now we illustrate how Person A’s and Person B’s will input their decisions. 
 
Person A’s Decision 
Every period Person A receives $5 new funds and decides how much to send to Person B. 
The remainder, if any, is deposited into the Person A account. For example, if Person A 
sends $5 to Person B, then nothing can be deposited into the Person A account. 
Alternatively, if Person A sends nothing to Person B, then $5 is deposited into the Person 
A account. 
 
The amount sent by Person A and the Joint Savings account at the end of the prior period 
are added together and multiplied by 1, 2, or 3 (all values are equally likely). The amount 
received by Person B equals the multiplied amount (multiplier times the total of amount 
sent and Joint Savings account).  
 
Starting in Period 2, Person A must decide whether to continue or dissolve the partnership 
with Person B. If Person A decides to dissolve the partnership, then Person A receives 40% 
of the balance in the Joint Savings account at that point, which is automatically deposited 
into the Person A account. The remaining 60% is deposited into the Person B account. 
The partnership is now over and both Person A and Person B will not make any further 
decisions in the experiment. In this, and all future periods, the $5 in new funds is 
automatically deposited into the Person A account. If Person A decides to continue, then 
Person A decides how much to send to Person B. 
 





Person A must decide how much to send to Person B by entering an amount in the blank 




Person B’s decision 
In stage 1, the amount sent by Person A’s is added to the Joint Savings account from the 
prior period. Recall that the Joint Savings account at the beginning of period 1 is empty. 
 
The total is multiplied before Person B receives it. The total is multiplied by 1, 2, or 3 
(there is an equal chance of each value). 
 
Person B decides on how the multiplied amount received is to be divided between deposits 
into three accounts. Person B decides how much to deposit in the Person B account, into 
the Person A account, and remainder is deposited into the Joint Savings account. If the 
total amount received by Person B equals zero, Person B cannot make any decision except 
to deposit zero into each account. 
 





Person B must decide how much to deposit in his/her account and how much into Person 
A’s account by entering amounts in the blank boxes above. Person B can deposit $0, $1, 
… up to the amount received, into each account, but the total deposited into both accounts 
cannot exceed the amount received. Whatever is not deposited into the Person B account 
or Person A account is automatically deposited into the Joint Savings account. For the 
example screen above, recall the Joint Savings account is empty at the start of Period 1. 
During the experiment, the amount sent by Person A, the multiplier, and amount received 
denoted with ‘?’ will be filled in. 
 
In the last period, Person B decides on a 2-way split of the multiplied amount received by 
him / their instead of the 3-way splits in previous periods. S/he decides how much of the 





Throughout the experiment Person A and Person B will see the history of their decisions. 
However, the information Person A sees differs from the information Person B sees. 
 
For example, Person A sees the following upon their screen at the end of period 1. Amounts 
denoted with a ‘?’ will be filled in. Since it is the first period, beginning balances are zero. 
After each period is complete, the table will be updated with a new row.  
 
Person A History 
 









1 0 ? ? ? 






The information shown to Person B differs. For example, Person B will see the following 
at the end of period 1. During the experiment, amounts denoted with a ‘?’ will be filled in 
depending on Person A’s and Person B’s decisions. Since it is the first period, beginning 
balances are zero. After each period is complete, the table will be updated with a new row. 
 
Person B History 
 




Balance I Deposited 
Ending 
Balance 
1 0 ? ? 
    
 






Deposited I Deposited 
Ending 
Balance 
1 0 ? ? ? 








Send Multiplier Earnings 
1 0 ? ? ? 
	 	 	 	 	
 
Joint Saving Account History 
 
Period # Earnings 
Deposited Into 





1 ? ? ? ? 






Notice that Person B is shown the multiplier, the Joint Savings Account, and how much 
they deposited into their own account (Person B account). Person A will never be directly 
told the multiplier, the balance in the Joint Savings Account, or the amount Person B 
deposited into the Person B account. This difference between what Person A sees and 













Completion of the Experiment 
Once all periods have been completed, you will be paid your earnings in US dollars plus 
your 7 US dollar show up fee. Experimental currency (ECU) will be converted to US 
dollars at the rate of 10 ECU to 1 US dollar. 
 
7.2 Quiz Questions  
Treatment differences noted in italics. Correct answer denoted in parenthesis. 




2. The ending balance in the Person A account and the Person B account can 









4. Will both the amount send by Person A and the last period’s Joint Savings 









6. Person A will be explicitly told the multiplier and the balance in the Joint 
Savings account?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
(a: if Reporting or Both treatments)  
(b: if Baseline or Liquidation treatments) 
7. Suppose that Person A sends 3 to Person B, and Person B and deposits 5 in the 






8. Suppose Person B receives 9, deposits 2 to the Person A account, and deposits 






9. Suppose the Joint Savings account balance is 40 at the start of the period and 
Person A chooses to dissolve the partnership. How much of the Joint Savings 










Manager Choices of Final Distribution  
 
Panel A: Possible Values to Investor Chosen by Manager 
 



















 < 0 < 0 < 0 
Yes 
 > 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 
Neutral 
Pay BW  
No smaller than paying 0 > 0 0 0 
Yes smaller than paying 0 > 0 0 0 
Praiseworthy 
Pay PW  
No smaller than paying BW 
> 0 and equal 
to paying BW 0 or > 0 0 or > 0 
Yes smaller than paying BW 
> 0 and equal 
to paying BW > 0 > 0 
  








BW = Minimum level need to avoid blame 
PW = Minimum level to obtain praise from Impartial Spectator 





Total Investor Payoff: The balance of the Investor’s private account at the end of the game. The 
sum of the 6 periods endowment, less the sum of investments, plus any interim dividends 











T = min{6,	period liquidated} 
INVESTOR_FIN& =	 <
DIV) , T = 6
40% × Joint Savings account&, T < 6
 
 
Total Manager Payoff: The balance of the Manager’s private account at the end of the game. This 
equals the sum of the salary kept by the Manager in interim periods (and not reinvested) plus 
the amount kept by the Manager in the final distribution or liquidation. 




T = min{6,	period liquidated} 
MANAGER_FIN& =	 <
SAL) , T = 6
60% × Joint Savings account&, T < 6
 
 
Wealth: The sum of the Investor payoff and Manager payoff at the end of the game. 
WEALTH = 	PAYOFF!"#$%&'( + PAYOFF56"67$( 
 
Efficiency: The wealth divided by the hypothetical wealth (given the realized multiplier values) 
that might have been assuming the Investor invested the maximum amount each period, the 
Manager reinvested the maximum in the interim periods. 
WEALTH (5 + (5 + (5 + (5 + (5 + 58!)8")8#)8$)8%)8&⁄  
  







Baseline 169.9 36% 44.3 125.6 
  No Reporting, No Liquidation 104.0 29% 35.0 60.5 
N = 36 (26.5) (4%) (4.4) (25.1) 
Information 252.3 45% 64.7 187.6 
  Reporting, No Liquidation 133.0 36% 33.0 97.0 
N = 35 (48.3) (5%) (13.7) (44.5) 
Liquidation 105.0 26% 46.1 58.9 
  No Reporting, Liquidation 78.0 19% 36.9 47.5 
N = 36 (12.8) (3%) (5.1) (9.3) 
Both 262.2 45% 103.9 158.3 
  Reporting, Liquidation 139.5 35% 37.5 86.0 
N = 36 (54.9) (5%) (26.8) (30.6) 














Baseline 21.9 14.9 110.5 
  No Reporting, No Liquidation 7.0 5.0 45.0 
  N = 35 (4.5) (4.5) (26.5) 
Information 46.9 35.7 180.9 
  Reporting, No Liquidation 9.5 6.0 92.0 
  N = 34 (14.9) (14.0) (46.5) 
Liquidation 22.2 18.6 47.4 
  No Reporting, Liquidation 9.0 8.0 23.0 
  N = 29 (6.7) (6.3) (11.0) 
Both 92.9 77.8 152.0 
  Reporting, Liquidation 11.5 6.0 55.5 
  N = 30 (33.0) (31.9) (37.3) 
Mean, median, (SEM) reported. 
 
Investor Final Distribution: The amount the Manager put into the Investor’s private account in the 
final period, if the Manager could choose. 
Net Investor Final Distribution: The final distribution shifted such that value positive if made 








Manager Final Distribution: The amount the Manager put into their own private account in the 
final period. If the final period’s earnings where zero, or the firm had been liquidated by the 





Panel B: ANOVA results 
Results of Reporting and Liquidation on the Investor Final Distribution 
Source S.S. d.f. F-ratio p-value 
Reporting 72,867 1 7.20 .008 
Liquidation 17,072 1 1.69 .196 
Reporting x Liquidation 16,511 1 1.63 .204 
 Note: The model had an F ratio of F(3,124) = 3.38, p = .020. 
Results of Reporting and Liquidation on the Net Investor Final Distribution 
Source S.S. d.f. F-ratio p-value 
Reporting 50,918 1 5.44 .021 
Liquidation 16,671 1 1.78 .185 
Reporting x Liquidation 11,718 1 1.25 .265 
 Note: The model had an F ratio of F(3,124) = 2.74, p = .047. 
Results of Reporting and Liquidation on the Manager Final Distribution 
Source S.S. d.f. F-ratio p-value 
Reporting 243,587  1 6.60 .011 
Liquidation 67,301  1 1.82 .179 
Reporting x Liquidation 9,328  1 0.25 .616 
 Note: The model had an F ratio of F(3,124) = 2.80, p = .043. 
 
Panel C: Results of best fit model 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽: +	𝛽,𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 +	𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠; + 𝛽<𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠;
+ 𝛽=𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 	𝜀 
 




Report × Investments2 0.456**  
Prior Dividends -0.194**  
Prior Salary -0.180*** 
Number of Observations 128    
R Squared 0.279    
Adjusted R Squared 0.249    
Note: ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
F(5, 122) =  4.52, Probability > F = .0008 
 
Reporting: Dummy variable equal one for Reporting and Both treatments. 
Investments2: sum of squared investments, 𝐼𝑁𝑉,; + 𝐼𝑁𝑉;; +⋯𝐼𝑁𝑉);. 
Prior Dividends: weighted dividends paid to the investor in interim periods, 𝐷𝐼𝑉, × 22 +
	𝐷𝐼𝑉; × 2= +⋯+𝐷𝐼𝑉2 × 2,. 
Prior Salary: weighted salaries kept by the Manager in interim periods, 𝑆𝐴𝐿, × 22 +
	𝑆𝐴𝐿; × 2= +⋯+ 𝑆𝐴𝐿2 × 2,.  
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Table 4 




















Baseline 3.2  2.5  3.6  26.1  63.0 
No Reporting, No Liquidation 3.2  2.0  2.9  14.5  63.4 
N = 36 (0.2) (0.4) (0.7) (4.5) (5.0) 
Information 3.8  2.4  2.4  35.9  69.7 
Reporting, No Liquidation 4.2  2.2  1.6  24.0  76.3 
N = 35 (0.2) (0.5) (0.5) (6.0) (4.9) 
Liquidation 3.5  3.4  3.8  15.5  52.6 
No Reporting, Liquidation 3.7  3.0  3.7  8.2  49.4 
N = 36 (0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (3.3) (3.9) 
Both 4.1  1.7  2.8   44.7  67.8 
Reporting, Liquidation 4.7  1.0  2.2   22.2  71.4 
N = 36 (0.2) (0.3) (0.7) (8.6) (5.0) 
Mean, median, (SEM) reported.   
 
Average Investment: The average investment in periods (1-6) if the firm had not been liquidated, 








Average Dividend to Investor: The average amount returned by the Manager in interim periods 
(1-5) if the firm had not been liquidated, else the average amount returned by the Manager 








Average Salary Taken by Manager: The average amount the Manager put into their own private 
account in interim periods (1-5) if the firm had not been liquidated, else the average amount 








Average Reinvestment by Manager: The average amount the Manager put into the joint savings 
account in interim periods (1-5) if the firm had not been liquidated, else the average amount 








Average Percentage Reinvested by Manager: The average amount the Manager put into the joint 











Measures of Maximum Efficiency by Treatment 
 Percentage of Economies Where in All Periods Maximum: 
Treatment Investment Reinvestment Efficiency 
Baseline 25.0 8.3 2.8 
N = 36 (7.3) (4.7) (2.8) 
Reporting 37.1 32.4 17.1 
N = 35 (8.3) (8.1) (6.5) 
Liquidation 19.4 2.8 0.0 
N = 36 (6.7) (2.8) (0.0) 
Both 27.8 25.0 13.9 
N = 36 (7.6) (7.3) (5.8) 
Mean, (SEM) reported.  
 
Maximum Investment: A dummy variable which is one if the Investor invested their entire 
endowment. 
𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇9 = <
1, 𝑖𝑓	𝐼𝑁𝑉9 = 5
0, 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
Maximum Reinvestment: A dummy variable which is one if the Manager reinvested all earnings 
she received. 
𝑀𝐴𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇9 = <
1, 𝑖𝑓	𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉9 = 𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆9
0, 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
Maximum Efficiency: A dummy variable which is one if the Investor invested their entire 





8 Figure 1 
Panel A: Baseline Version of the Reinvestment Game 
 
 
In the last period reinvestment is not possible due to game’s end. The manager thus chooses final distribution 
such that DIV6 + SAL6 = EARNINGS6.  
 
Reporting treatments: Investor sees earnings, reinvestment, balance of the joint savings account, salary, and 
the balance of the manager’s private account. Otherwise, the Investor only sees the investment, the remainder 
kept, and the dividend. 
 
Liquidation treatments: At the end of periods 1-5, the investor can elect to dissolve the firm, which moves 40% 
of the joint savings account balance into the investor’s private account and moves the remainder into the 
manager’s private account. Future endowments are moved directed into the investor’s private account. 
 
Panel B: Experimental Treatments 
 
 No Reporting Reporting 
No Liquidation Baseline Reporting 
 Liquidation Liquidation Both 
 
Investor 
In each period t is 
endowed with 5, 







EARNINGSt =  
 lt(INVt + REINVt-1) 
Where lt = 1, 2 or 3 













then pays dividend 
to investor, keeps 
salary, and reinvests 
where DIVt + SALt + 














NOTE: If the investor distribution was less than 𝐵𝑊 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥{∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉9 −)9+, ∑ 𝐷𝐼𝑉9 , 1}29+, , then we 
classify the final distribution as blameworthy; if it was greater than 𝑃𝑊 = 40%	𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉2 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉), 
then we classify the final distribution as praiseworthy, otherwise we classify the distribution as 
neutral. In those cases where PW was less than or equal to BW, we classify the final distribution 





















Joint Savings Account Over Time  
 
NOTE: The average balance of the Joint Savings account of the non-liquidated firms graphed over 
the six periods. As the firm is dissolved in the last period and managers are required to distribute 
earnings between themselves and the investors, we report the earnings before the final 
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Figure 4 
Bubble Charts of Investment and Reinvestment 
  
Note: Within each chart the firms are classified by investor behavior on the x-axis (average 
investment was less than or more than half the maximum the investor could invest of their 
endowment) and manager behavior on the y-axis (average reinvestment the less than or more 
than half maximum percentage the manager could reinvest of earnings). The bubble size reflects 
the number of economies falling into the classification, where the smallest bubble is 1.5 percent 
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